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ABSTRACT 
The tension between Public Affairs (PA) and Information Operations (IO) 
illustrates the struggle to organize and synchronize informational elements in 
support of homeland defense and civil support. Public Affairs focuses on 
credibility by providing factual information in a responsive manner to present a 
positive image of the organization. Information Operations focuses on proactive 
operations that use influence to shape the information environment. Public Affairs 
and IO’s purpose is to communicate the command mission and operations. The 
current informational landscape does not support a cohesive informational 
strategy. Current doctrine creates a tension between these two elements that 
centers on credibility. This tension prevents cohesive informational efforts. The 
principles of war and the nature of the information environment compel a need 
for an organizing construct and synchronizing force for effectiveness. This study 
examines policy and doctrine to understand the nature of the information 
environment, PA, IO and Strategic Communication (SC). The study examines an 
optimal organizational strategy using the Star Model that provides the organizing 
construct and the required synchronizing force. The outcome of this research is a 
set of policy and doctrine recommendations that will support optimal organization 
and synchronization of information elements to communicate effectively for the 
homeland. 
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I.  THE HUNTING OF THE SNARK 
For the Snark’s a peculiar creature, that won’t 
Be caught in a commonplace way. 
Do all that you know, and try all that you don’t 
Not a chance must be wasted to-day!1 
Many people view military operations as focused on putting bombs on 
target. However, even getting bombs on target requires the multiple elements of 
logistics and network connectivity. Homeland defense and support of civil 
operations do not often involve direct or kinetic action, such as putting bombs on 
target. For these operations, multiple informational elements, such as Public 
Affairs (PA) and Information Operations (IO), play a vital and growing role. These 
elements develop the narrative for an operation. The narrative tells the story of 
the operational events, and supports its execution. This narrative carries as much 
weight as any other operational activity. Without it, operations can be stifled or 
ineffective.  
Operations are guided by the principles of war.2 These principles are time 
tested and operationally understood in a military context. Operations also take 
place within a defined space. For informational elements, this space is called the 
information environment. Creating a cohesive narrative with multiple 
informational elements has become increasingly complex because these 
elements are not synchronized and organized to create a cohesive narrative. 
Together, the principles of war and the information environment require an 
organizing construct and synchronizing force for effective informational activities.  
                                            
1 Lewis Carroll, The Hunting of the Snark (New York, NY: Penguin Putnam, 1974), 68. 
2 Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3–0 Joint Operations (Incorporating 
Change 1) (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 2008), II–21. 
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A.  THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN INFORMATIONAL ELEMENTS 
The tension between PA and IO illustrates the larger struggle to organize 
and synchronize informational elements to support homeland defense. These 
informational elements support the operational objectives of deterring attacks, 
defending the homeland, supporting civil authorities, and reassuring audiences. 
According to Joint Publication 3–61,  
PA and IO activities directly support military objectives, counter 
adversary disinformation and deter adversary actions. Although 
both PA and IO require planning, message development and media 
analysis, the efforts differ with respect to audience, scope and 
intent, and must remain separate.3  
Based on the guidance of Joint Publication 3–61, these two means of using 
information in homeland defense and civil support would seem distinct and 
mutually supporting.  
Public Affairs focuses on credibility by providing factual information in a 
responsive manner. Its purpose is to create and maintain a positive image of the 
organization or command. It emphasizes communicating via the media to 
domestic audiences.4 This passive or responsive nature is reflected in the 
mention of passive PA guidance or the use of “respond to query.”5 Public Affairs 
packages the factual information to present a positive organizational image. It is 
strictly limited to informing its audience.6 It never attempts to influence an 
audience. 
Information Operations integrates capabilities, especially informational 
capabilities, to gain an operational advantage. The landscape of IO is divided 
between its doctrine and its practice. Its doctrine focuses on how to use 
                                            
3 Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3–61 Public Affairs (Arlington, VA: 
Department of Defense, 2005), xii.  
4 Ibid., II–1. 
5 James Lacey, “Who's Responsible for Losing the Media War in Iraq?” Proceedings 130, no. 
10 (October 2004): 39–40.  
6 DoD, Joint Publication 3–61 Public Affairs (2005), III–18. 
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information against adversaries to enable mission accomplishment. It can do this 
by enhancing or protecting operations, shaping foreign perceptions of operations, 
or by deterring, influencing, disrupting, or corrupting adversary activities.7 
Doctrine defines IO as being comprised of five core and a number of related and 
supporting capabilities. Electronic Warfare (EW) and Computer Network 
Operations (CNO) are a technical means of conducting IO.8 Operations Security 
(OPSEC), Military Deception (MILDEC), and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) 
are a cognitive means of conducting IO.9 Information Operations can be passive 
and responsive (OPSEC or Computer Network Defense (CND)) but also 
proactive in nature (PSYOP, EW, MILDEC and Computer Network Attack 
(CNA)).10 The doctrine of IO affects the selection of information and what it tells 
the adversary. The practice of IO integrates any set of capabilities to gain an 
operational advantage. It seeks to affect the will, understanding, or capability of 
an intended audience. While doctrine focuses on information and adversaries, 
practice focuses on the audience and the tools to accomplish the objective. This 
distinction drives to different ends and limits the implementation of IO.  
While each element’s focus is distinct, PA and IO’s aim is to communicate 
in support of the command mission and operations. It is their doctrine that 
creates a tension between these two elements; that tension is centered on the 
idea of credibility.  
The above considerations challenge whether PA and IO can be organized 
and synchronized to support homeland defense and civil support operations. If  
 
 
                                            
7 Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations 
(Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 2006), I–1, I–6. 
8 Computer Network Operations consolidates both Computer Network Attack (CNA) and 
Computer Network Defense (CND).  
9 DoD, Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations (2006), II–1–II–5. 
10 Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations 
(Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 1998), viii.  
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this cannot happen, PA and IO will likely overlap and contradict each other in the 
execution. This will impede the freedom of operational action and detract from 
mission accomplishment.  
Organizing and synchronizing informational elements is filled with tension, 
which is metaphorically illustrated in the Victorian children’s story, The Hunting of 
the Snark. This tale, written in 1876 by Lewis Carroll, describes the journey of a 
group of ten characters in search of an elusive Snark.11 No one has the slightest 
idea what a Snark looks like. This story illustrates the axiom that we know a good 
or bad idea when we see it, but not until then. The informational efforts for 
homeland defense and civil support are still forming, but a guiding idea has not 
been found. How do we identify this guiding idea for organizing and 
synchronizing informational elements before we see it? This thesis examines the 
form and function of these informational elements in an effort to divine what the 
Snark, or a cohesive informational strategy, looks like. 
B.  RESEARCH QUESTION 
What policy will allow for the optimal organization and synchronization of 
informational elements (PA and IO) that will enable them to communicate 
effectively in support of homeland defense and civil support? 
 What are the functions of PA and IO as informational elements?  
 The functions of PA and IO are rooted in the individual 
nature and culture of each discipline. Understanding these 
natures and cultures will aid in aligning them into a cohesive 
strategy.  
 What are the barriers to the integration and synchronization of PA 
and IO? 
 The very nature of PA and IO form the barriers, and 
therefore the challenges, in the PA-IO interaction that might 
limit implementation of a cohesive strategy. 
 What recommendations concerning policy, doctrine, and culture will 
allow for optimal organization and synchronization of PA and IO? 
                                            
11 Carroll, The Hunting of the Snark, 17–19. 
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 Understanding natures, cultures, barriers, and options 
creates choices. These choices must work seamlessly 
together to ensure effective operations within the information 
environment.  
C.  METHODOLOGY AND OUTLINE 
Chapter II is a literature review that describes the information 
environment, information, PA, IO, Strategic Communication (SC) and the PA-IO 
interface. These are examined for the contributions and challenges each brings 
to the problem. Additionally, selected organizational design and complexity 
theory literature is summarized as it relates to the tension between organizational 
elements. The literature review also provides a picture of ideal practices. Chapter 
III includes interviews of personnel from the Joint Forces Command and Joint 
Information Operations Warfare Command, who understand the broader practice 
of PA, IO, and SC within the Department of Defense (DoD), and bring a real-
world context to these practices. These interviews describe the collective DoD 
experience and acquired knowledge in this area. Other interviews include those 
with North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and United States 
Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) personnel who practice PA, IO, and SC 
for homeland defense and civil support operations. 
Chapter IV analyzes the data of the previous two chapters. It puts forth the 
argument for why the organization and synchronization of informational elements 
is needed. Following the argument and analysis, the Galbraith Star Model 
provides a means to place properly aligned organizational and synchronized 
segments in a cohesive strategy.12 It will present “a systematic diagnosis of 
                                            
12 Jay R. Galbraith, Designing Organizations: An Executive Briefing on Strategy, Structure 
and Process (San Francisco, CA: Jossey–Bass Publishers, 2002), in “Building Collaborative 
Capacity: An Innovative Strategy for Homeland Security Preparedness,” Innovation through 
Collaboration: Advances in Interdisciplinary Studies of Work Teams, Susan Page Hocevar, Gail 
Fann Thomas, and Erik Jansen, 12, ed. Michael Beyerlein (Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier 
Ltd., 2006), 259.  
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organizational factors that both enhance and impede collaboration, while also 
guiding action toward improved collaborative capacity.”13 
The final chapter includes policy recommendations concerning the optimal 
organization and synchronization of the information elements to support 




                                            
13 Susan Page Hocevar, Gail Fann Thomas, and Erik Jansen, “Building Collaborative 
Capacity: An Innovative Strategy for Homeland Security Preparedness,” in Innovation through 
Collaboration: Advances in Interdisciplinary Studies of Work Teams, 12, ed. Michael Beyerlein 
(Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier Ltd., 2006), 259.  
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II.  MAPPING THE ENVIRONMENT 
Other maps are such shapes, with their islands and capes! 
But we've got our brave Captain to thank: 
(So the crew would protest) that he's bought us the best— 
A perfect and absolute blank!14 
Like the brave Captain in the quote above, it might be easier to start with a 
blank map and re-envision how information elements might be synchronized and 
organized. Public Affairs (PA) and Information Operations (IO) have developed 
doctrines and policies concerning their function, process, organization, and 
interaction with each other and with other elements, like Public Diplomacy and 
Senior Leadership Engagement. Likewise, the information environment and 
information have well-established definitions within the Department of Defense. 
This chapter reviews relevant doctrine, policy, and literature about the 
information environment, information, PA, IO and Strategic Communication (SC) 
to discern the definition and nature of these areas. Other selected literature about 
organizational design and complexity are reviewed to support the analysis that 
will be presented later in this thesis.  
A. THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 
The DoD definition of the information environment reads as follows: “The 
aggregate of the individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, 
disseminate and act on information.”15 
Figure 1 illustrates the information environment as being a combination of 
people, places, and things that do something with information. This is a simple 
view of the information environment, and is a starting point for any discussion 
about it. The nature of this environment can be understood by examining its 
dimensions, domains, information superiority, and complex adaptive systems. 
                                            
14 Carroll, The Hunting of the Snark, 56. 
15 DoD, Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations (2006), I–1. 
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Figure 1.   Breakdown of the Definition of the Information Environment16 
1. Dimensions of the Information Environment 
The Joint Publication 3–13 doctrine describes the three dimensions of the 
information environment: physical, informational, cognitive. The physical 
dimension contains the people, places, and things that have the information. The 
informational dimension consists of the data or information itself. The cognitive 
dimension represents the intangibles about information, and is often understood 
as the matter in the mind.17 The dimensions create a construct in which people, 
places, and things interact with information. The dimensions also point to the 
pervasive and global nature of the information environment.  
2. Domain and Environment 
The information environment can be understood by comparing it to a 
domain. Domains provide a means to understand the conduct of operations. 
Domains are defined by their physical characteristics. These characteristics can 
be as follows:  
                                            
16 DoD, Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations (2006), I–1. 
17 Ibid., I–1–I–2. 
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…terrain (including urban settings), weather, topography, 
hydrology, electromagnetic (EM) spectrum, and environmental 
conditions in the operational area; distances associated with the 
deployment to the operational area and employment of forces and 
other joint capabilities; the location of bases, ports, and other 
supporting infrastructure; and both friendly and adversary forces 
and other capabilities.18 
Land, air, maritime, and space are accepted as domains in U.S. military doctrine. 
For example, one can distinguish the land domain from the air domain because 
each has definable and distinct properties. However, these properties cannot be 
applied to the information environment. Instead, the information environment acts 
as “a pervasive backdrop” to the domains,19 meaning that its characteristics do 
not adhere to those of a domain. Information can exist throughout any domain. 
These characteristics distinguish the information environment from the domains.  
3. Superiority, Supremacy and Dominance 
Every military commander desires to obtain superiority or supremacy in 
operations. In military terms, maritime superiority, air superiority, and space 
superiority are defined by the degree of dominance in a given domain in a battle 
of one force over another. Supremacy is defined by the degree of superiority 
wherein the opposing force is incapable of effective interference in that domain. 
While dominance is not defined in military doctrine, it can be construed from this 
construct as control over a domain. Interestingly, land or military superiority in 
U.S. military doctrine is never defined.20 
The links between superiority, supremacy, and dominance can be viewed 
as similar to the links between distance, velocity, and acceleration. Each one 
builds on the previous piece. In basic physics, distance is a simple measure from 
                                            
18 DoD, Joint Publication 3–0 Joint Operations, II–21. 
19 Ibid., I–22. 
20 Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication 1–02 Department of Defense 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (as amended through May 30, 2008) (Arlington, VA: 
Department of Defense, 2001), 28, 262, 305, 330, 346, 506. 
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point A to point B. Velocity is the measure of the time required to cover a 
distance, or simply distance divided by time. Acceleration is the measure of the 
rate of change in velocity or distance divided by time. In a similar fashion, 
dominance can be correlated to the control of a domain. Superiority equates to 
the degree of dominance. Supremacy equates to the degree of superiority. Each 
measure is connected as part of a qualitative measure of control of a domain. 
Lesser degrees of control over a domain increase risk in achieving operational 
objectives and ultimately mission accomplishment. While distance, velocity and 
acceleration are quantifiable, dominance, superiority, and supremacy are 
subjective. 
4.  Information Superiority 
Doctrine defines information superiority as follows: 
The operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, 
process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while 
exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.21 
This definition does not focus on the degree of control of a domain. Instead, it is 
a subjective measure of one’s advantage versus another’s forces. This definition 
points to the pervasive and complex characteristics of the information 
environment by describing it in different terms than other domains. To add to its 
differences, military doctrine never defines information supremacy or information 
dominance.22 Doctrine makes the point that, unlike domains, the information 
environment cannot be controlled.  
5. Information Environment as a Complex Adaptive System 
The information environment can be viewed as a complex adaptive 
system. Edward Smith defines a complex adaptive system as one that “internally 
                                            
21 Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication 1–02 Department of Defense 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 262. 
22 Ibid. 
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changes unpredictably and also adapts to its external environment in similarly 
unpredictable ways.”23 Considering this view, an informational action works 
simultaneously in multiple and unexpected ways.24 This model reinforces the 
pervasive nature of the information environment while demonstrating the 
complexity of it. Joint Publication 3–0 and 3–13 both acknowledge this 
complexity by describing the information environment as dynamic, transcendent, 
and pervasive.25 The information environment can exist in any domain and is 
global. The rise of global communications, the Internet and around-the-clock 
news convey the immediacy, complexity, pervasiveness, and dynamics of the 
environment. Essentially, current doctrine portrays the information environment 
as complex, pervasive, and global in nature.  
B. INFORMATION 
Information flows like water or energy within the information environment. 
The DoD defines information as “1) the facts or data in any medium or form; 2) 
the meaning that a human assigns to data by means of known conventions used 
in their representations.”26 The first definition conveys a simple understanding of 
information. The second definition forms the critical center of what informational 
elements work to accomplish. Every communication focuses on the meaning 
assigned with the goal of either informing or influencing. Public Affairs focuses its 
activity on informing an audience.27 Information Operations focuses on affecting 
or influencing an audience.28 The distinction between informing and influencing is 
the barrier between PA and IO. 
                                            
23 Edward A. Smith, Complexity, Networking, and Effects–Based Approaches to Operations 
(Washington, DC: DoD/Command and Control Research Program, 2006), 41. 
24 Informational action does not mean necessarily a communication. Instead, it could be 
employing a show of force.  
25 DoD, Joint Publication 3–0 Joint Operations, I–21, 22; DoD, Joint Publication 3–13 
Information Operations (2006), III–1. 
26 DoD, Joint Publication 1–02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms, 260. 
27 DoD, Joint Publication 3–61 Public Affairs (2005), III–20.  
28 DoD, Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations (2006), II–1. 
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1.  Inform versus Influence and the Smith-Mundt Act 
Inform means to impart knowledge, whereas influence aims to affect or 
sway. The clearest difference between them comes from the Smith-Mundt Act of 
1948, which, among a number of other laws, says that federal funds appropriated 
for influencing foreign audiences cannot be used to influence domestic 
audiences.29 The problem with this law is the lack of an effective enforcement 
mechanism beyond the Congressional power over funding.30 
The Smith-Mundt Act was developed and passed in 1948. It was designed 
to govern the new United States Information Agency (USIA) in its public 
diplomacy mission overseas.31 The legislation was concerned with the 
competitive effect of a government news agency, like USIA, broadcasting within 
the U.S. on the fledgling U.S. media in 1948. This prohibition was intended to 
protect the U.S. media from government interference. Over the years, the law 
has been applied to the Department of State and DoD.32 It still governs the use 
of funding for influencing a domestic audience.  
The Smith-Mundt Act was created when little or no global communication 
existed. The U.S. media had limited connectivity to the events abroad. In 
contrast, the current environment boasts global communication and around-the-
clock news services. Any communication that is directed toward a foreign 
audience also can be sent to a domestic audience in moments via multiple 
avenues of communication. Today’s information elements would be challenged 
to communicate to a single audience. Therefore, the Smith-Mundt Act only 
remains valid today if one assumes there is a single intended audience for the 
communication. 
                                            
29 U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (or Smith Mundt Act of 1948), 
Public Law 402, 80th Cong., 2d sess. (January 1948).  
30 Kevin R. Kosar, Public Relations and Propaganda: Restrictions on Executive Agency 
Activities (Washington, DC: Congressional Reporting Service, 2005), CRS–5. 
31 U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (or Smith Mundt Act of 1948). 
32 Ibid. 
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C. PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
Public Affairs (PA) doctrine originally was developed in 1997 with the 
broader emergence of Joint doctrine. It defined PA as “those public information, 
command information, and community relations activities directed toward both 
the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense.” 33 
The 1997 version of the PA doctrine defined command information and 
community relations, but lacked any clarity on public information until the 2005 
version.34 This updated version defines PA as a communication capability with a 
three-fold function and a potentially wide audience for its communications.35 
Figure 2 provides the definitions of each function.  
 
 
Figure 2.   Public Affairs Functions36 
                                            
33 Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3–61 Public Affairs (Arlington, VA: 
Joint Staff, November 14, 1997), GL–2. 
34 Ibid. 
35 DoD, Joint Publication 3–61 Public Affairs (2005), III–3.  
36 Ibid., vii–xii. 
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These functions portray one aspect of the nature of PA, namely its 
organizational focus. Command information provides information to those 
connected to an organization. Community relations describes communications 
between an organization or installation and the nearby community. Public 
information is disseminated through the media by the releasing agency or 
organization. Each of these functions is grounded in the organization and its 
communication with a given audience. The organization’s primary function drives 
the relationship between PA and the entity it represents.   
1.  Differences Between the Public Affairs Doctrine of 1997 and 
2005 
While the definition remains unchanged from 1997, the updated doctrine 
addresses several aspects not adequately discussed or mentioned at all in the 
1997 doctrine. The 2005 PA doctrine spells out PA responsibilities, the 
fundamentals of information, target, or intended audiences, the relationship of PA 
and IO, access of the media, and PA in homeland defense and civil support.37 
Public Affairs in homeland defense and civil support was a new development 
after 2002, and represented adjustments to PA doctrine due to a new mission 
set. These adjustments recognize the need to integrate into a larger inter-agency 
structure of public information efforts. The other changes to the 2005 doctrine 
provide distinctions and clarity to develop the nature of PA in contrast to other 
organizational elements.  
2. Public Affairs Responsibilities  
The overall responsibilities of PA as put forth in the 2005 doctrine identify 
two responsibilities: “1) Using Public Affairs to support command strategy; 2) 
Using public information to attack an adversary’s strategy.”38 This is similar to the 
1998 definition of IO, which is to affect another’s information while protecting your 
                                            
37 DoD, Joint Publication 3–61 Public Affairs (2005), iii.  
38 Ibid., I–3–I–4.  
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own.39 The one distinction here is PA’s priority of responsive activity over 
proactive activity. This points to PA’s bias toward the organization, and its 
support or defense of the organization’s strategy.  
3. Fundamentals and Principles of Information 
The PA doctrine throughout speaks to providing information about an 
organization’s activities. The doctrine avoids the idea of influence, and strictly 
adheres to the idea that PA only informs its audience. The Fundamentals of 
Information and the Principles of Information emphasize informing over 
influencing by directly stating that one should “tell the truth,” and that 
“propaganda has no place in DoD PA.”40 The DoD defines propaganda as 
“communication designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or 
behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor.”41 Understanding the 
importance of informing an audience versus influencing an audience helps to 
maintain the credibility of the organization. Maintaining this credibility recognizes 
a position one must defend.  
 
 
Figure 3.   Fundamentals of Information42 
                                            
39 DoD Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations (1998), I–1. 
40 DoD, Joint Publication 3–61 Public Affairs (2005), I–3, I–5, I–6. 
41 DoD, Joint Publication 1–02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms, 439. 
42 DoD, Joint Publication 3–61 Public Affairs (2005), I–5–I–6.  
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The Fundamentals of Information, as seen in Figure 3, and the Principles of 
Information, as seen in Figure 4, were added to the 2005 doctrine to guide 
commanders in effectively employing PA.  
 
 
Figure 4.   Principles of Information43 
The fundamentals and principles of information align with the nature of 
PA. These two lists lie at the core of PA, and reflect its overall nature as 
responsive first, organizationally focused, informing, and seeking to maintain 
credibility. They also affirm the need for truth and avoidance of propaganda that 
are in line with its doctrinal view. The main concept throughout these lists of 
attributes is the goal of preserving the credibility of PA.  
4. Public Affairs Literature 
The literature focuses on the need to make PA operational, and to make 
military commanders at all levels aware of PA capabilities.44 Derik Crotts, Dawn 
                                            
43 DoD, Joint Publication 3–61 Public Affairs (2005), I–3.  
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Cutler, and John Kirby, all PA professionals, mention PA as an operational 
function that has growing importance to the operational commander.45 The 
literature focuses squarely on PA as an operational function, but it imparts little 
information as to how PA should act in this fashion. The literature recommends 
that leadership bring PA into the operational fold.  
The literature consistently discusses how PA could perform an influence 
function. This would be accomplished through truthful informing of the 
audience.46 Where IO sources include PA as an IO capability, PA sources 
throughout the literature consistently point to these elements as “separate and 
distinct” entities; the literature does say coordination between the two is 
important.47 Kenneth Pascal makes the case for commanders understanding 
how capabilities of PA might support operational ends. He also examines the 
danger of mingling PA and IO.48 Both the implying “informing as influence” and 
the “separate and distinct” threads in the literature consistently are tied to 
maintaining credibility.49 Credibility is seen as the critical factor in countering 
                                            
44 John F. Kirby, “Helping Shape Today’s Battlefield: Public Affairs as an Operational 
Function,” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition Essays 2000, ed. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 2000), 83. 
45 Derik W. Crotts, “Operational Implications of Public Affairs—Factors, Functions, and 
Challenges of the Information Battlefield” (Master’s thesis, Naval War College, 2005), 13; Dawn 
E. Cutler, “Public Affairs: An Operational Planning Function to Safeguard Credibility and Public 
Opinion” (Master’s thesis, Naval War College, 2004), 3; Kirby, “Helping Shape Today’s Battlefield: 
Public Affairs as an Operational Function,” 84. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Kirby, “Helping Shape Today’s Battlefield: Public Affairs as an Operational Function,” 93; 
Cutler, “Public Affairs: An Operational Planning Function to Safeguard Credibility and Public 
Opinion,” 11. The concept of “separate and distinct” is derived from DoD Directive 5122.5, which 
contains the DoD Principles of Information. The words “separate and distinct” are found in the 
1997 version of JP 3–61 Joint Public Affairs in context of PA and Psychological Operations. 
These words, in the same context, are again used in the 2005 version of JP 3–61.  
48 Kenneth M. Pascal, “Preparing for the “Perception” War: Why a Better Public Affairs 
Program is Important to the Operational Commander” (Master’s thesis, Naval War College, 
2004), 15. 
49 Kirby, “Helping Shape Today’s Battlefield: Public Affairs as an Operational Function,” 93; 
Pascal, “Preparing for the “Perception” War: Why a Better Public Affairs Program is Important to 
the Operational Commander,” 11. 
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disinformation and building audience trust of the organization.50 The PA literature 
confirms the focus of PA as providing factual information, maintaining credibility, 
and of being organizationally focused and defensive in nature.51  
D.  INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
Information Operations doctrine was created in 1998.52 The original 
definition of IO read, “… actions taken to affect adversary information and 
information systems while defending one’s own information and information 
systems.”53 This provides a simple view of IO, which is that IO gains an 
advantage through information. However, another aspect of the definition is that 
IO has two parts: offensive and defensive information operations. The 1998 
doctrine codified this with separate chapters on offensive and defensive IO.54 
This created a division between the two capabilities. This defeated the purpose 
of the IO by simply viewing the IO actions as offensive or defensive. The divide 
was corrected in 2005 in the update of the doctrine. The new definition reads as 
follows: 
The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic 
warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, 
military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified 
supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or 
usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making while 
protecting our own.55 
                                            
50 Pascal, “Preparing for the “Perception” War: Why a Better Public Affairs Program is 
Important to the Operational Commander,” 11; Michael Perini, “Public Communications: Vital Link 
to Maintaining the Public’s Trust during Crisis,” Threats at our Threshold, ed. Bert B. Tussing 
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006), 210.  
51 Pascal, “Preparing for the “Perception” War: Why a Better Public Affairs Program is 
Important to the Operational Commander,” 3; Henry L. Huntley, “The Role of Public Diplomacy 
and Public Affairs in the Global War on Terrorism” (Master’s thesis, U.S. Army War College, 
2005), 3; Michele Tasista, “Global Media and Public Affairs Communications in a New Era of 
Defense: The War against Terrorism” (Master’s thesis, University of Colorado, 2002), 84. 
52 DoD, Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations (1998), vii. 
53 Ibid., I–1. 
54 Ibid., vii. 
55 DoD, Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations (2006), I–1. 
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1.  Capability Focus of Information Operations  
Information Operations integrates capabilities. It moves beyond an 
offensive- or defensive-only view, allowing these integrated capabilities to be 
used either offensively or defensively. The IO definition specifies the core 
capabilities.56 This has bound the nature of IO into these capabilities. The 
capability list acts as a resource list for the development of requirements. The 
upfront focus on individual capabilities ignores achieving an operational effect by 
integrating the full spectrum kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities together. The 
doctrine of IO is concerned with the employment of capabilities first. In practice, 
the desired effect is considered first. Then capabilities are matched and 
integrated to meet the desired effect, for example, dropping PSYOP leaflets in 
Iraq to encourage surrender prior to the U.S. invasion in 2003.  
2. Audience Focus of Information Operations 
The definition points to an audience, namely the adversary. An adversarial 
audience is consistent with the influence function of IO, but in practice IO also 
regularly communicates with neutral and friendly audiences. This definition limits 
the possibilities and does not reflect the realities of practicing IO. The majority of 
intended audiences worldwide are related to peacekeeping and stabilization 
operations.57 For example, current operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and the former 
Yugoslavia have influence communications aimed at neutral and friendly foreign 
audiences.  
3. Task Focus of Information Operations 
The definition contains a task list, specifically to influence, corrupt, disrupt, 
and usurp. It defines specific tasks, again ignoring the broader possibilities of  
 
                                            
56 DoD, Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations (2006), I–1. 
57 Joint Information Operations Warfare Command (JIOWC) Subject Matter Expert in 
discussion with author, July 1, 2008.  
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information operations integrating all capabilities focused on the desired effect. 
Considering the potential audiences of IO, influencing, corrupting, disrupting, and 
usurping of neutral and friendly audiences are not likely tasks. 
Another job identified on the task list is to “usurp.” Simply defined, usurp is 
to seize and hold by force or without a legal right. The last part of the DoD 
definition makes the point that usurp implies an illegality of action. The flaw here 
lies in having an integrated set of capabilities that are concerned with actions that 
affect the perceptions of others. If IO actions are perceived as illegal, does that 
not defeat the purpose and ethics of the action itself? JP 3–13 makes this point 
very clearly: 
IO may involve complex legal and policy issues requiring careful 
review. Beyond strict compliance with legalities, US military 
activities in the information environment as in the physical domains 
are conducted as a matter of policy and societal values on a basis 
of respect for fundamental human rights.58 
4. Protect Our Own Decision Making 
The last part of the definition points to an aspect of the mission that is ill-
considered by IO. Protection of our decision making is understood in the sense of 
defending the physical or information dimensions of the information environment 
through the practice of Computer Network Defense (CND) or Operations Security 
(OPSEC). The possibility here is how IO defends the cognitive dimension, i.e., 
protecting an audience from adversarial propaganda or incorrect information. 
While all capabilities can somehow protect the cognitive dimension, information 
will seep into it. Acknowledging that influencing the domestic audience is not 
legal, and that there is little difference between informing and influencing, is there 
then a role for IO to inform audiences as a means of protection?  
                                            
58 DoD, Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations (2006), I–6. 
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5. Different View of the Definition of Information Operations 
Figure 5 shows the British and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 




Figure 5.   Definitions of IO59 
This adheres to the integrated concept of IO. The audience becomes broader by 
mentioning adversary, potential adversary, and other leadership-approved 
audiences. These definitions point to the guidance of political and military 
objectives. The definitions also focus on a given target–the understanding and 
capability of an intended audience, or the will, cohesion, and decision-making 
ability of the intended audience. This steers clear of the U.S. focus on specific 
capabilities only, and aims directly at the target of IO efforts. If IO starts with the 
will, cohesion, or understanding of an audience, then the right combination of 
capabilities can be chosen to accomplish the objectives. The 1998 U.S. doctrine 
understood the decision-maker’s mind as the ultimate target of IO.60 While the  
 
 
                                            
59 United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare Publication 3–80 
Information Operations (Shrivenham, UK: United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, 2002), 2–1; North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, AJP 3–10 Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (Brussels, 
Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 4th Study Draft), 1–3. 
60 DoD, Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations (1998), II–1. 
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U.S. definition lacks the clarity of purpose for IO, the practice of IO reveals it as a 
coordinated set of activities targeting an audience, either to affect or protect the 
audience’s information environment.  
6. Information Operations Literature 
The focus of the literature remains in line with the IO doctrine first written 
in 1998, where the concepts of defensive and offensive IO capabilities were 
used. The 2006 update addresses the need for intertwining capabilities to 
support a more universal application of IO. This moves the focus away from the 
offensive and defensive view of the 1998 doctrine.61 The literature review limits 
the use of sources written prior to 1998 due to shifting concepts concerning IO 
doctrine.  
A significant thread that runs throughout the literature is the idea of IO as 
an umbrella over several informational capabilities that include PA.62 Samuel 
Morthland puts forth a compelling discussion of the larger IO umbrella, and 
emphasizes the need to coordinate and synchronize all of these capabilities in 
order to support strategic and operational needs.63 PA is seen as another means 
to execute IO. The IO literature reviewed never alludes to the misuse of PA that 
would definitely lead to discrediting it.64  
Overall, the literature presents IO as operationally focused, capable of 
offensive and defensive action, and seeking to shape the environment to support 
                                            
61 DoD, Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations (1998), i, iii. 
62 Samuel P. Morthland, “Information Operations: The Need for a National Strategy” 
(Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2002),13; Richard K. Dougherty and Pablo F. Mir, 
“Organizational Structure for Inter–Agency Information Operations” (Master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2001), 18; Bryan R. Freeman, “The Role of Public Diplomacy, Public 
Affairs, and Psychological Operations in Strategic Information Operations” (Master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2005), 5. 
63 Morthland, “Information Operations: The Need for a National Strategy,” 13. 
64 Freeman, “The Role of Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, and Psychological Operations in 
Strategic Information Operations,” 12; Tadd Sholtis, “Public Affairs and Information Operations: A 
Strategy for Success,” Air & Space Power Journal XIX, no. 3, (2005): 99. 
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the strategic/operational requirement.65 This view typically entails the use of 
information in any means, proactive or defensive, to support policy or 
operations.66 The literature focuses on the larger possibilities of IO, if decision 
makers truly understood its full potential. The literature rarely considers the 
limitations that are imposed on the practice of IO within the homeland and toward 
friendly foreign audiences.  
E. “SEPARATE AND DISTINCT”—WHERE PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND 
INFORMATION OPERATIONS DO NOT MEET 
To this point, this literature review has discussed the nature of PA and IO 
based on their separate doctrines. Both doctrines clearly articulate the 
relationship between PA and IO. In 1997, IO doctrine was undefined due to IO 
being a recently invented term.67 The 1997 PA doctrine defined the distinctive 
function of PA, and mentioned the need for separation when discussing PA and 
civil military operations, public diplomacy and psychological operations. Despite 
this separation, PA doctrine recognizes the need for adequate coordination to 
ensure credibility with the audience.68  
The 1998 IO doctrine never mentions the importance of the separation of 
PA and IO, or even PSYOP. Instead, it emphasizes the close coordination and 




                                            
65 Freeman, “The Role of Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, and Psychological Operations in 
Strategic Information Operations,” 8; Morthland, “Information Operations: The Need for a National 
Strategy,” 12.  
66 Morthland, “Information Operations: The Need for a National Strategy,” 17; Paul S. 
Warren, “A New Kind of War: Adaptive Threat Doctrine and Information Operations” (Master’s 
thesis, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2001), 8. 
67 NORAD USNORTHCOM Subject Matter Expert, interview by author, April 18, 2008. 
68 DoD, Joint Publication 3–61 Public Affairs, III–18, III–19. 
69 DoD, Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations (1998), II–6. 
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doctrines define the PA-IO relationship. The language in both doctrines explains 
the necessity of separating them.70 The following statement represents the core 
understanding of this guidance.  
Although both PA and IO require planning, message development 
and media analysis, the efforts differ with respect to audience, 
scope and intent, and must remain separate.71 
The reason given is, again, to maintain credibility.72 
The doctrine of “separate and distinct” creates the needed distance to 
allow for credibility of PA with its audiences, typically the media. This doctrine set 
forth between the 2005 PA doctrine and 2006 IO doctrine was preceded by a 
Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum that emphasized the need for commanders to 
keep PA and IO separate. This was seen as a reemphasizing of the separation. It 
also focused this separation on having distinct audiences. PA covers domestic 
and international audiences. IO only covers the foreign adversary audiences.73 
This audience distinction is in keeping with the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948.  
The PA and IO literature focuses on primarily PA or IO, with limited 
discussion of mixing the two. The literature does not stray far from the “separate 
and distinct” doctrinal guidance.74 The literature considers the mixing of IO into 
PA as diluting the credibility of PA with the media.75 Credibility acts as the 
lifeblood of PA, and is apparent in the PA literature. Gary Patton put forth a clear 
                                            
70 DoD, Joint Publication 3–61 Public Affairs (2005), III–20; DoD, Joint Publication 3–13 
Information Operations (2006), II–9. 
71 DoD, Joint Publication 3–61 Public Affairs (2005), III–20.  
72 Ibid. 
73 Department of Defense, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Memorandum: Policy on 
Public Affairs Relationship to Information Operations (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 
2004).  
74 Cutler, “Public Affairs: An Operational Planning Function to Safeguard Credibility and 
Public Opinion,” 11; Kirby, “Helping Shape Today’s Battlefield: Public Affairs as an Operational 
Function,” 93.  
75 Kirby, “Helping Shape Today’s Battlefield: Public Affairs as an Operational Function,” 91; 
Pascal, “Preparing for the “Perception” War: Why a Better Public Affairs Program is Important to 
the Operational Commander,” 11. 
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sense of the PA-IO relationship, saying the credibility issue is key to how the 
interaction occurs.76 This lifeblood might be seen as a challenge to how PA and 
IO interact. Despite “separate and distinct” means, Bryan Freeman, Gary Patton, 
and Tadd Sholtis all agree on the need to integrate and synchronize the two 
functions to support operations effectively.77  
F. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION 
Being able to communicate coherently and successfully to an audience 
with a cohesive message requires synchronization of communication efforts 
across the government. To achieve this, the United States government uses 
Strategic Communication (SC), which requires the collaboration of several 
government agencies, including the Department of State (DOS), Department of 
Defense (DoD) and the Broadcast Board of Governors (BBG).78 The DOS acts 
as the lead agency for SC, which creates the perception that SC is based on 
communication for foreign audiences. Strategic Communication is comprised of 
both communications for foreign and domestic audiences, and serves to 
coordinate communication with both foreign and domestic audiences. With the 
news services and global communication, messages provided domestically have 
as much impact messages provided to foreign audiences.  
Department of State has developed a strategy for public diplomacy and 
SC, but has never defined SC.79 The lack of clarity about SC creates confusion,  
 
                                            
76 Gary S. Patton, “Public Affairs and Information Operations: Integral or Incompatible?” 
(Master’s thesis, U.S. Army War College, 2000), 2. 
77 Freeman, “The Role of Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, and Psychological Operations in 
Strategic Information Operations,” 1; Patton, “Public Affairs and Information Operations: Integral 
or Incompatible?” 14; Sholtis, “Public Affairs and Information Operations: A Strategy for Success,” 
102. 
78 Government Accounting Office, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts 
Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy (Washington, DC: Government 
Accounting Office, 2005), 7. 
79 Department of State, Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Policy Coordination 
Committee, U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication 
(Washington, DC: Department of State, 2007), 1. 
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and potentially could defeat the purpose of attempting to synchronize 
communications. The definition of SC has been nebulous to date, most notably 
defined by DoD in 2006 as follows:  
Focused United States processes and efforts to engage and 
understand key audiences to create, strengthen, and preserve 
conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives 
through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, 
programs and actions synchronized with other instruments of 
national power.80 
Strategic Communication is not a product but rather a process by which 
the multitude of government organizations can integrate and synchronize 
communications using an orchestra of capabilities to create cohesive themes and 
messages that support national strategic objectives. Among those capabilities 
are public diplomacy, PA, and IO.81 This is not an exhaustive list but an 
understood set of capabilities. Any capability (a message or an action) supporting 
the objective is a capability that supports SC. In this construct, SC cannot be 
viewed as a peer of PA and IO, but rather an overarching process.82 
Strategic Communication remains a relatively new concept in the 
government and the military. The SC literature provides a wide view of what it 
could be and where it should develop. The current literature of SC resembles that 
of IO prior to 1998, which used conflicting terms and concepts that left the true 
course of IO in doubt. Once the 1998 doctrine was developed, the literature could 
derive from that doctrinal baseline, and propose different views and directions for 
IO. The SC literature focused on the Defense Science Board (DSB) reports of 
                                            
80 Department of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2006 Quadrennial Defense Report 
Strategic Communication Execution Roadmap (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2006), 
3. 
81 Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, Final Report of the Defense Science 
Board Task Force on Strategic Communication (Washington, DC: Defense Science Board, 2004), 
6. 
82 Matt Armstrong, interview by author, October 21, 2008. Matt Armstrong is an advocate of 
public diplomacy and has written extensively on public diplomacy, Information Operations, Public 
Affairs, and the Smith Mundt Act.  
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2001, 2004 and 2008.83 The imperative is the need for national policy and 
definition. The lack of the national SC policy and definition lends itself to a 
fragmentary SC effort. Bryan Freeman states that the current application of PA, 
PSYOP, and public diplomacy are fragmentary and diffuse.84 For effective SC, 
these elements must be synchronized and coordinated.85 The DSB report, titled 
“Managed Information Dissemination,” recommends that the U.S. government 
speak with a common voice (i.e., Strategic Communication), and identifies 
several ways to organize and change policy to accommodate this 
recommendation.86 Overall, the literature of SC does not address the clash of 
cultures between PA and IO. 
Strategic Communication is based on the concept of communicating in 
support of the national strategic objectives laid out in the National Security 
Strategy.87 Two documents describe what SC should be. The first is the DSB 
Task Force report published in 2008. The DSB Task Force recognizes SC as a 
key element to support national power by preventing and limiting conflicts and 
enhancing responses. The task force views SC as a dynamic process with critical 
responsibilities at the upper levels of government. Strategic Communication, in 
the opinion of the task force, is conducted through strong adaptive networks 
within government and between government and civil society. Strategic  
 
                                            
83 Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, Final Report of the Defense Science 
Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination (Washington, DC: Defense Science 
Board, 2001), 1–7; Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, Final Report of the Defense 
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Board, September 2004), 1–9; Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, Final Report of 
the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication (Washington, DC: Defense 
Science Board, 2008), ix–xxi. 
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Communication requires the same level of transformation that government has 
employed in transforming intelligence, defense, and homeland security.88 The 
task force determined that success in SC depends on:  
 Need for better understanding of cultures and attitudes;  
 Leadership understanding that actions mean more than words;  
 Better understood structures between elements of the government 
and civil society; and 
 A solid model of guidance that is flexible and transforms current 
structures into adaptive structures for the future.89 
The other report of consequence is the Government Accountability 
Office’s 2006 report on U.S. public diplomacy. The report points out several 
efforts by the White House to promote public diplomacy efforts through the 
establishment of offices with public diplomacy responsibilities, and the 
development of strategies to promote such efforts. It notes most significantly that 
no national communication strategy has been developed. According to the report, 
the goal of public diplomacy is to improve understanding of the U.S. and to 
counter misinformation. The report also calls for transformation in public 
diplomacy based on its increasing importance. The report urges high-level 
leadership involvement in SC, structural changes in the government to enhance 
SC mechanisms, and better coordination among SC stakeholders.90  
The lack of a single government definition and general SC policy allows 
for broad interpretation of SC. Potentially, the lack of policy is evidence of the 
embryonic and developing nature of SC. It was developed as a process to drive 
synchronization of multiple efforts, and as a bridge to an organic and natural 
communication effort born out of planning or operations.  
                                            
88 DoD, Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication 
(2004), v. 
89 Ibid., x. 
90 Government Accounting Office, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts 
Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy (Washington, DC: GAO, April 
2005), 2–5. 
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The tension between PA and IO highlights the difficulty in fully 
synchronizing SC, and may be a contributing factor to the temporary nature of 
SC. The PA doctrine calls for separation from IO, PSYOP and public 
diplomacy.91 This doctrinal position is in contrast to the goal of SC. While 
synchronization is possible, it remains inefficient in execution. This inefficiency is 
linked to endangering the credibility of PA by its connection to another element. 
Public Affairs depends on being credible in its communication with the media. 
Information Operations capabilities are perceived as not truthful in their 
execution. This perception forces PA to need separation and distinction from 
IO.92  
The principles of SC exist as its only policy. This portrays the SC concepts 
discussed above, and adds a set of principles as seen in Figure 6 that frame the 
conduct of SC.  
 
 
Figure 6.   Principles of Strategic Communication93 
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93 Department of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Joint Communication, Principles 
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The principles represent a leap forward for SC. Leadership is the first principle, 
and points to the need for top-down leadership and guidance in the SC process. 
“Credible” validates the doctrinal call for separation between elements. 
“Pervasive” points to an understanding of the global information environment. 
“Unity of effort” underpins the basic premise of SC. “Responsive,” as indicated 
here, concerns sending the right message to the right audience at the right time. 
It also implies responding to communications, which requires a balance of 
proactive and responsive actions. “Responsive” could imply that the U.S. is not 
proactively communicating.  
Most of these principles guide SC in a correct direction, but they lack any 
defined authority to direct the elements or to compel synchronization under an 
SC process. Therefore, the principles cannot be viewed as enough to change the 
nature or the culture of the informational elements.  
G. ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
1. The Star Model 
Jay Galbraith and Amy Kates’s Star Model is a means to examine the 
interrelated pieces of an organizational design. Its structure can incorporate the 
complexity of the information environment and the elements. As an 
organizational design framework, the Star Model specifies five capabilities that 
guide high performance: strategy, structure, process, rewards, and people 
(Figure 7).94  
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Figure 7.   The Star Model95 
The capabilities are the core of the strategy. “Structure” is based on where 
the formal decision making, authority, and power are located for an activity. 
“Process” describes the flow of information during an activity. “Rewards” relate to 
the motivation and values of the people involved in the activity. “People” 
describes the development of the personnel who accomplish the activity. The 
benefit of using this model is that it provides a means to examine distinct, 
interrelated aspects of an organizational design without focusing solely on 
structure.96  
2. Characteristic Considerations for a Cohesive Strategy  
The literature identifies a wide range of characteristics for a cohesive 
informational strategy. Thomas Davenport and Laurence Prusak provide a view 
on characteristics that create friction in and among organizations, as noted in 
Figure 8. These characteristics reinforce the need for credibility/trust, 
understanding other cultures, and limiting firewalls between groups.  
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Figure 8.   Friction Characteristics97 
Galbraith and Kates put forth several characteristics to consider when 
designing a strategy for an organization; they specifically identify coherence, 
active leadership, reconfigurability, and clarity of interfaces. “Coherence” implies 
a common direction in the organization. “Active leadership” provides the direction 
and guidance to create decision frameworks for effective operations and choices. 
“Reconfigurability” posits that an organization must be able to change as fast 
internally as the external environment changes. “Clarity of interfaces” relate to 
having a basic and clear means to coordinate and interact within an 
organization.98 
Joint Publication 5–0’s Joint Operation Planning says that a course of 
action can be evaluated based on adequacy, acceptability, feasibility, and 
completeness.99 Each of these criteria has some context in the organization and 
synchronization discussion. Two in particular are of interest in evaluating any 
informational strategy. They are acceptability and feasibility.100 “Acceptability” 
relates to the acceptable cost and proportionality of the course of action in 
accomplishing the mission. “Feasibility” implies the ability to undertake a course 
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of action.101 Considering the current doctrine and policy, any strategy must find a 
balance or acceptability among all of the informational elements. The elements 
must then be able to engage the strategy and act.  
H. COMPLEXITY 
The information environment is characterized as a complex adaptive 
system based on the definition provided by Edward Smith, as mentioned earlier. 
Any strategy for organizing and synchronizing informational elements must 
consider the complexity of the information environment.  
1. What is Complexity? 
Charles Perrow in Normal Accidents describes complex as “interactions in 
an unexpected sequence,” as opposed to linear events, which he defines as 
“interactions in an expected sequence.”102 Smith conveys his understanding of 
complexity by defining what is complicated in comparison to what is complex. His 
analogy is that of a modern car (complicated). One can explain in a linear fashion 
how the complicated car will react based on pressing down on the accelerator. If 
the car is complex, the outcome would be unpredictable; i.e., the car would 
contain several interdependent parts that would interact in unpredictable ways. 
Smith posits that these complex interactions hold the promise of solving new 
challenges.103 According to Robert Alexrod and Michael Cohen, complexity 
focuses on strategy or agent interaction, strategy variation and the selection of 
successful strategies, and the continual interplay of these parts.104  
Smith gives this view on complex adaptive systems.  
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In reality, we must deal not just with a complex system but with a 
complex adaptive system, one that not only changes unpredictably, 
but also adapts to its external environment in similarly 
unpredictable ways.105  
The complex adaptive system has a set of interrelated parts. Each of these parts 
can act as autonomous agents that through their respective actions can impact 
other agents. These interactions define the system. The agents can act in 
expected patterns (complicated) or challenge those patterns (complex).106 The 
complicated car will always accelerate when one presses down on the 
accelerator. The complex car could explode when one presses down on the 
accelerator.  
2. Implications of Complexity and Complex Adaptive Systems 
The informational activities or even the kinetic activities within the 
information environment have unpredictable effects on other actors, just as their 
activities act unpredictably on us. Public Affairs and IO, both informational 
elements, must act and interact in this complex adaptive system. Both PA and IO 
encompass multiple interdependent parts that interact with other parts. 
Information Operations attempts to integrate its core related and supporting 
capabilities into operations, and potentially communicate to foreign audiences. 
Public Affairs interacts with internal, external, foreign, and domestic audiences 
through multiple capabilities. Public Affairs and IO could be considered complex 
systems. As complex systems, they interact within a command in a complex 
manner, and take action externally in a complex environment. Any organizing 
and synchronizing strategy thus developed must embrace the complexity of the 
entire system. An understanding of complexity, of complex adaptive systems, 
and of the information environment will enable more effective informational 
activities.  
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The mapped environment provides a landscape of challenges to 
organizing and synchronizing informational elements. The information 
environment is characterized as pervasive, global, and complex in nature. 
Information and the elements relate based on the divide between an activity 
being informing or influencing. Public Affairs seeks to maintain credibility by 
providing truthful information to any audience to create a positive image of its 
organization. Information Operations doctrine and practice limit clarity in 
implementing and synchronizing IO. Public Affairs-Information Operations 
interaction is governed by the need for credibility. This need creates a barrier for 
synchronizing and organizing informational elements. Strategic Communications 
provides a potential path through that barrier. However, the lack of definition and 
authority limit its real impact on informational elements. The environment 
mapped is challenging and extremely complex for organization and 
synchronization of these elements. The mapped environment requires a complex 
model and the Star Model best suits this analysis and alignment of organizational 
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III. DISCERNING THE HORIZON THROUGH INTERVIEWS 
He was thoughtful and grave—but the orders he gave 
Were enough to bewilder a crew. 
When he cried "Steer to starboard, but keep her head larboard!" 
What on earth was the helmsman to do?107 
The environment mapped in the literature review requires a real-world 
context to discern the horizon of policy, doctrine, practice, and the informational 
elements. This section melds together interviews with subject matter experts 
covering the areas of the information environment, information, Public Affairs 
(PA) and Information Operations (IO) and Strategic Communication (SC). The 
interviews were conducted over the course of several months in 2008. These 
were guided discussions that allowed the interviewees to respond in an open 
forum based on their knowledge and experiences concerning the informational 
elements, how PA and IO interact, how the elements should be organized, and 
who should lead a synchronized informational effort.  
The names of the individuals for all but the last interview have been 
withheld to allow for a free flowing discussion of experience and knowledge. The 
first interview included three individuals from North American Aerospace Defense 
Command (NORAD) and United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). 
The group included an active-duty public affairs officer, a reserve public affairs 
officer and information operations analyst, and a former psychological operations 
(PSYOP) officer who currently works as a strategic communication planner. The 
second interview was with an individual from the Joint Information Operations 
Warfare Command (JIOWC). The individual was a trained PYSOP officer who 
currently acts as an IO and SC planner. This individual interacts regularly with 
USNORTHCOM, U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. Strategic Command. This 
individual also spent time in Iraq, once as an IO/PSYOP officer and later as an 
SC planner. The third interview was with an individual who served three years at 
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the Joint Warfighting Center (JFWC). This individual’s duties were related to the 
conduct of SC, PA, and IO with several combatant commands. Combatant 
commands serve as joint service strategic commands for either a geographic 
region (North America) or functional area (special operations). This individual 
provided firsthand knowledge of the organization and synchronization of PA and 
IO across the DoD. The final interview was with Matt Armstrong, who has written 
and speaks extensively concerning national communication efforts, specifically 
public diplomacy and strategic communication. 
In the course of the discussions, several themes emerged that expanded 
the literature review to include the aim of informational activities, the lack of 
coordination between PA and IO, the need for credibility, and SC policy and 
authority. The experts provided a well-rounded set of attributes and skills 
concerning persons who might lead and synchronize PA and IO in a combatant 
command.  
A. AIM OF INFORMATIONAL ACTIVITIES 
During the course of reviewing documents and the interview with 
Armstrong, one issue about informational activities became apparent. What is the 
aim of our activities? Informational types would say that we are attempting to win 
hearts and minds. Armstrong, in his writings and during the interview, made the 
point that this is the wrong aim. If informational activities are to provide 
information with the intent of changing a behavior or the action of someone, then 
the objective should be to struggle for the “minds and wills” of the audience. 
Word choice matters in informational activities. One must carefully consider the 
desired outcome, and develop objectives and corresponding action 
accordingly.108  
Armstrong contends that winning the hearts and minds of an audience 
lends itself to a beauty-contest mentality. The end state asks the question: Do 
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you like me? This mentality aims at making the world resemble America. Instead, 
Armstrong suggests the struggle for minds and wills, which should ask the 
question: Can we coexist? The informational activities should aim at creating an 
end state where the global community can coexist, and that allows us to achieve 
other goals without interference. This twist on word choice displays the 
complexity of action and engagement in the global information environment.109  
B. LACK OF COORDINATION BETWEEN PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND 
INFORMATION OPERATIONS  
In the previous chapter, doctrine pointed to the separation between PA 
and IO. The experts interviewed agree that doctrinal concepts have led to cultural 
differences, i.e., the culture at the operational to tactical (lower) levels is different 
from the culture at the strategic/departmental (higher) levels. These differences 
are, by all accounts, surmountable at the tactical and operational levels, but 
almost impossible to overcome at the strategic and department levels. The 
reason for the barriers at the higher levels, according to the interviewees, is due 
to ownership (policy direction) and resourcing (funding and manpower) issues. At 
the higher levels, delineation of responsibilities and meager resources create 
barriers that restrain integration of PA and IO. The restraint rises out of a fear of 
losing resources or responsibilities. The tension or barriers at the lower levels are 
surmountable due to the proximity to mission accomplishment. The tension is 
focused on overlapping audiences (foreign and domestic). The foreign and 
domestic audiences are different. PA can communicate with both; IO only can 
communicate with foreign audiences.110 IO doctrine focuses on the adversary.111 
Information Operations practice demonstrates that non-adversarial foreign 
audiences are a key audience. The distinction between audiences creates the 
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most difficult barrier between PA and IO, and stems from the perceived 
difference between informing and influencing. The tension between PA and IO, 
regardless of the level, breeds inefficient operations. If both PA and IO cannot 
agree and cooperate, informational activities and operations suffer. All of the 
interviews bore out that once PA and IO get past the doctrinal issues that 
separate them, the relationship between them has the potential to work well.112   
The PA professionals discussed the culture of PA as special, citing its 
close relationship with its commander.113 They also saw PA as separate, relating 
to the doctrinal view put forth by Joint Publication 3–61.114 This cultural view 
creates a tendency, as one PA professional stated, toward working alone. 
According to one of the experts, PA in the past would not consider coordinating 
with or maintaining the visibility of IO. Yet this same expert stated that IO is likely 
PA’s biggest operational advocate. Public Affairs in a combatant command works 
directly for the commander as a special staff advisor. PA lacks an operational 
credibility. Information Operations can validate PA activities as operationally 
necessary. Recent combat camera employment by IO at USNORTHCOM was 
cited as a recent validation of PA requirements for coverage of fighting wild land 
fires in late 2008.115 While this one area points to the possibilities of coordination, 
the current PA-IO barriers limit this potential.  
C. NEED FOR CREDIBILITY  
Public Affairs doctrine and professionals speak to the need for 
credibility.116 Credibility for any communicator equates to trust from an audience 
and success in communication. For PA, credibility is maintained by being 
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trustworthy to an audience. The separations within doctrine all cite maintaining 
credibility for PA.117 All of the experts interviewed agree that PA needs credibility, 
but they also saw the same need in all other informational elements.118 During a 
presentation to the DoD’s Visual Information Workshop 2008, Rear Admiral 
Frank Thorpe, the current chief of naval information, stated that he had never 
met a “PSYOP’er” (Psychological Operations Personnel) who was not worried 
about credibility.119 The Joint Information Operations Warfare Command subject 
matter expert stated that the importance of credibility, while important, is 
exaggerated by the PA community. In his words, PA works for DoD like any other 
element; however, its relationship with the media is biased because its message 
is perceived by the media as being the voice of DoD. Since perception is reality 
in the information environment, being credible is critical. That credibility may be 
undermined because the message will always be geared toward achieving DoD 
strategic goals.”120 
D. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION POLICY AND AUTHORITY 
Armstrong uses the analogy of an orchestra when discussing SC: If one 
envisions an orchestra, every instrument is working in concert with all the other 
instruments to create a structured blend. Every instrument must do exactly its 
part for the music to work. Otherwise, the effort lacks synergy or harmony, and is 
ruined. In contrast, Armstrong said, imagine SC as a jazz ensemble. The jazz 
ensemble is a flexible and adaptable construct; the music is dependent on the 
agreement of the players as the music is being played. One player can stray from 
the dominant theme without destroying the music. In fact, if straying is more 
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attractive, the entire ensemble can follow suit.121 This analogy is much more 
suited to the pervasive and complex nature of the information environment that 
the informational elements must face together. The only counter to this analogy 
lies in the seemingly unstructured and random nature of the jazz ensemble, 
where the players must understand their instrument and create relationships that 
will ensure a coherent effort.  
The orchestra construct of SC depends on the authority of the conductor 
over the musicians. The jazz ensemble construct also requires guidance and 
direction, even if the outcome is unknown. However, SC lacks the authority to be 
a synchronizing force for informational activities. The lack of SC policy means 
there is no adequate mechanism to motivate or direct the informational elements 
beyond their existing doctrine and culture. All of the experts interviewed agreed 
that leadership is the critical factor that currently is lacking in executing the SC 
process.122 
E. LEADERSHIP 
Leadership was understood by all of the interviewees to be the key 
ingredient for organizing and synchronizing multiple informational efforts. The 
leader must have some ability to navigate all of the capabilities while ensuring 
the application of the right capabilities in the correct venues. This leader must be 
an “honest broker” or “tie breaker.” The experts agree that this leader must 
understand all of the capabilities and the existing information environment.123  
One interviewee believes that personnel with a PA background would 
have the requisite communication experience.124 Some of the NORAD and 
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USNORTHCOM interviewees believe IO personnel would have the best view of 
the entire informational situation.125 Those same interviewees believe operations 
personnel would have the authority and understanding of how informational 
elements fit into the larger mission. However, each area also has serious 
limitations. For PA, the culture of being separate and of having a special 
relationship to the combatant commander would hinder the balancing of and 
optimal use of all the informational elements. For IO, the limitation in leading 
informational elements would be the perceived stigma of deception and 
psychological operations that can impact credibility. This would hinder the 
integration with other elements. The director of operations needs to be in the 
chain for these activities, according to one source, but not directly in charge of 
them.126  
The ideal candidate would be, according to multiple sources, a solid staff 
officer and a communication-savvy operator with a planning background.127 This 
leader would need rank equal or higher than the respective PA and IO chiefs.128 
The experts with a public affairs background leaned toward an experienced PA 
person. However, one clarified that any PA person in this arrangement would 
have to be divorced of the current PA culture. Otherwise, the effort would have a 
distinct PA focus, which would limit the application of other elements to their full 
potential, and likely maintain the separation between elements.129 This leader 
would require the following traits.130 
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 Broad understanding of informational elements 
 Solid communication skills 
 Well-rounded staffing ability 
 Extensive planning and operational background 
These skills would provide the ability to create a plan and a vision, to navigate 
the informational elements, act as a critical communicator for the organization, 
credibly advise senior leadership, and execute the plan. One expert suggested 
that this may require more than one person. Typically, the small SC office would 
contain an SC director, who would deal with the senior leadership and develop 
the vision for the command SC efforts, and a deputy, who would plan and 
execute SC within the staff and command elements. This construct allows for 
some variances in personnel in order to build a stronger team that can conduct 
the broad range of activities associated with informational activities in a 
combatant command.131  
The interviews validated the real-world context of the literature review. The 
aim of PA and IO was defined by the interviewees as communicating the 
command mission and operations. This aim was modified by Armstrong in the 
interviews as the struggle for the collective mind and will of an audience. The 
reasons for the lack of PA-IO coordination are intrinsic to their nature. The 
interviews revealed this cultural mismatch and the missed opportunities for better 
coordination. Doctrine points to a barrier between PA and IO based on PA’s need 
for credibility. However, the interviews pointed to the need for credibility by all 
informational activities. Strategic Communication policy reflects an ideal 
construct of an orchestra. Armstrong provides a more practical construct with his 
analogy of a jazz ensemble. Analogies aside, SC’s greatest hindrance is that it 
lacks the authority to force any transformation of the informational elements.  
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IV. ANALYSIS 
In one moment I've seen what has hitherto been 
Enveloped in absolute mystery, 
And without extra charge I will give you at large 
A Lesson in Natural History.132 
The tension between Public Affairs (PA) and Information Operations (IO) 
is no mystery. It can be seen in the policies and practice of both elements. This 
tension inhibits a cohesive narrative for homeland defense and civil support. 
Examining the principles of war and the information environment illustrates the 
need for a cohesive narrative, for an organizing construct, and a synchronizing 
force for informational elements. The principles of war are time-tested principles 
that lead to effective operations, if followed. The information environment is the 
space where PA and IO operate. Any informational organizing and synchronizing 
strategy must engage the information environment, and adhere to the principles 
of war. Otherwise, the existing tension between elements will continue. 
A. THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR 
Joint doctrine recognizes the principles of war, and includes them in the 
Joint Publication 3–0 Joint Operations.133 Army doctrine, the source for the 
principles of war for Joint doctrine, states that the principles of war are vital to 
“operating successfully across the military spectrum,” and that they form the 
bedrock of Army doctrine.134 Three principles form underlying proof concerning 
the need to organize and synchronize PA and IO, namely unity of effort, mass, 
and economy of force. Each of these principles will be defined. Then each one  
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will point to a task related to organizing and synchronizing PA and IO. Finally, the 
current state of the mapped environment is examined in connection to the 
principle.  
1.  Unity of Effort 
Unity of command or effort seeks to gain a unified direction or coordination 
through cooperation and common interests to achieve the commander’s 
objective.135 Specifically, this principle points to the need for synchronizing the 
activities of PA and IO. Public Affairs and IO are governed by the “separate and 
distinct” guidance. The concept of “separate and distinct” builds credibility for PA, 
but comes at the cost of a barrier between PA and IO. “Separate and distinct” 
limits synchronization between elements and works contrary to unity of effort. 
2.  Mass 
Mass or force concentration seeks to gather appropriate forces to 
accomplish the desired effect in a timely manner. Mass points to the need for an 
organizing construct. The principle of mass also puts distinct elements with 
distinct means to tackle a given operational objective.136 These distinct means 
increase the variety of potential solutions that can address the challenge. In 
applying mass, however, no organizing authority exists to move PA and IO to 
mass effects. Loosely applying Newton’s first law of motion, PA and IO will 
continue to act in their nature unless acted upon by an external force. Although 
SC could be the process where this authority resides, no policy empowers that 
authority. 
3.  Economy of Force 
Economy of force seeks to allocate only the essential force that is needed 
to achieve the objective, and does not leave any force without tasks to perform 
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during the execution of operations.137 This principle guides optimal and efficient 
implementation of capabilities to gain the operational objective. It also limits poor 
or non-employment of capabilities.  
In the interviews, PA is described as being without operational credibility. 
This credibility is very different from the media or audience credibility created by 
the “separate and distinct” guidance. “Separate and distinct” guidance creates 
the barrier to operational credibility. In effect, PA cannot integrate easily into 
operations, even though the literature amply points to the need for it. The lack of 
integration limits optimal and efficient use of PA in operations.  
Information Operations doctrine points to a much more limited view of IO 
execution. This focus is on specified capabilities, tasks, and a very limited 
audience. Doctrine guides or informs the practice of a given area to the 
leadership. For IO, it creates barriers to potential areas where operational 
advantage can be gained. Specifically, IO can apply to a wide range of 
capabilities, tasks, and an extended audience. The current practice of IO 
demonstrates its fuller potential. The mismatch between practice and doctrine 
works against optimal and efficient use of IO in operations.  
The problem space demonstrates significant barriers and limitations. Unity 
of effort is hampered by the need for credibility and the “separate and distinct” 
guidance. Mass or force concentration is limited by the lack of authority to 
organize and direct the informational elements. Economy of force is illusive with 
both PA and IO. Public Affairs requires operational credibility. Information 
Operations requires clarity between its doctrine and practice.  
B. THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT  
The informational elements operate, synchronize, and execute in the 
global, pervasive, and complex information environment. The information 
environment is defined as “the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and 
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systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.”138 This 
definition points to the global and pervasive character of the information 
environment.139 In describing the information environment, JP 3–13 states that 
the information environment is pervasive through the air, land, sea, space, and 
cyber domains.140 This pervasive nature implies information can reside 
everywhere. This quality points to a need for cohesion or synchronization of 
informational efforts. Again, the concept of “separate and distinct” creates a 
barrier that works against the pervasive nature of the information environment. 
On the other hand, the global nature points to audience. This global and 
pervasive nature can result in a message sent to one particular audience also 
being received by multiple other audiences. This demonstrates the overlap that is 
most pronounced in communication for homeland defense and civil support. 
Messages for foreign audiences may actually be received by domestic audiences 
and vice versa. The global nature of the information environment reinforces the 
lack of ability to segregate audiences. Current practices do attempt to segregate 
audiences. Informing activities (PA) communicate to domestic and foreign 
audiences. Influencing activities (IO) communicate only to select foreign 
audiences. This segregation creates a barrier to synchronized efforts. It ignores 
the global nature of the information environment. Also, it potentially erodes 
overall credibility for the communication effort as the information crosses to 
unintended audiences.  
As discussed in Chapter II, the information environment with its three 
dimensions (physical, information and cognitive) can be thought of as a complex 
adaptive system. This implies that the system acts in unpredictable ways 
internally and externally. With its three-part construct of the information 
environment, one might conclude that controlling the information environment is 
a readily attainable goal. The measure or control of this environment is defined 
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as information superiority, which would be the aggregate of the degree of control 
over the physical, information, and cognitive dimensions. Control of the cognitive 
dimension becomes an extremely subjective measure that is biased based on 
one’s relative position. Hence, any measure of control of the information 
environment would be nebulous at best. An exploration of dominance, 
superiority, and supremacy within the information environment demonstrates that 
controlling this environment is difficult at best.  
C. ALIGNING STRATEGY FOR INFORMATIONAL ELEMENTS 
That’s exactly the method, the Bellman bold in a hasty parenthesis 
cried, that’s exactly the way I have always been told that the 
capture of Snarks should be tried!141 
Choices abound in policy, doctrine, and practice. As discerned from the 
data and analysis, the current choices have created barriers and limitations to 
optimal organization and synchronization. What choices in policy, doctrine, and 
practice align to optimize organization and synchronization? The literature review 
identified the Star Model as a means to align these strategic choices. It provides 
a feasible means of examining the variables of a strategy for organization and 
synchronization. This model, as reviewed, identifies five points that serve as 
interrelated areas of an organizing and synchronizing strategy. It encompasses a 
means to view people, rewards, process, structure, and capabilities. In 
considering a strategy for organizing and synchronizing informational efforts, the 
strategy must be able to handle the demands set forth by the principles of war 
and the nature of the information environment. The Star Model accommodates 
the complex environment and elements. During the data collection, cultural 
interaction and leadership were two significant issues that emerged, both of 
which can deeply affect organization and synchronization. For this analysis, the  
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Star Model will be modified to incorporate culture and leadership. Overall, this 
modified model (Figure 9) meets the needs of the structural demands as they are 
described here.  
 
 
Figure 9.   Modified Star Model142 
This data presents no clear best strategy for homeland defense and civil 
support. The complexity of the information environment and the elements 
themselves do not provide a simple means to accomplish this feat. Instead, the 
optimal elements are recommended based on their ability to support the 
principles of war, engage the information environment, enable synchronization, 
and reinforce organization.  
1. Capabilities 
Kates and Galbraith put forth:  
 
                                            
142 Kates and Galbraith, Designing Your Organization: Using the Star Model to Solve 5 
Critical Design Challenges, 2–3. 
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… organizational capabilities as the unique combination of skills, 
processes, technologies, and human abilities that differentiate a 
company. They are created internally and are thus difficult for 
others to replicate.143 
In this study, the organizational capabilities of PA and IO fit this definition. This 
study has alluded to two issues concerning capabilities: operational credibility of 
PA, and IO doctrine and practice. Public Affairs needs to increase operational 
credibility; IO can aid this operational credibility by validating PA activities in 
operational channels. Increasing operational credibility integrates PA as an 
operational function, and increases synchronization between PA and IO. For the 
organizational capability of IO, its doctrine needs to reflect IO practice. By 
aligning practice and doctrine, IO practitioners and decision makers gain clarity of 
purpose. This clarity allows for greater accessibility and employment for IO. Both 
of these actions will increase synchronization between informational elements, 
and reduce barriers to organization. The actions will also simplify integrating PA 
and IO, and support mass or force concentration. Realigning PA and IO ensures 
optimal force application or economy of force. Finally, these actions are 
conducive to the pervasive nature of the information environment.  
2. People 
For the Star Model, “People” implies certain practices.144 For this analysis, 
it can be defined as a cross-pollination of knowledge. Information personnel 
require education and continuous training about other informational elements. 
Non-information personnel require education about these elements and how they 
integrate. This education and training lowers barriers between operations and 
informational elements, and aids in synchronization. It also enables unity of 
effort.  
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Critical Design Challenges, 6. 
144 Ibid., 22. 
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3. Rewards 
“Rewards” in the Star Model refers to behaviors that enable success, and 
usually take a monetary form. Considering that these elements operate in the 
military environment, monetary rewards are not an option. Instead, recognition 
and promotion are incentives to the personnel in these fields. Rewards would 
need to be tied to increasing synchronization and reinforcing organization, and 
would depend on metrics. The key desired effect would be naturalization of 
informational activities and elements into mainstream operations. This would 
require significant shifts in mindset and operations for all personnel. Metrics 
could be tied to successful integration of informational activities. It would 
reinforce unity of effort, and engage the complexity of the information 
environment.  
4. Process 
Conducting informational activities requires a process or path to create, 
coordinate, synchronize, gain approval, and execute a specific action. Currently, 
each informational element has a distinct process. The actual processes can be 
defined for PA and IO roughly as public affairs guidance (to inform) and PSYOP 
product approval (to influence). This set of distinct methods allows for a broad 
range of processes to facilitate informational activity. It also allows for significant 
variation and adaptability in creation and dissemination. This adaptability exists 
without any unity of effort or creation of mass. These distinct processes can be 
very responsive and proactive, but not in any synchronized manner.  
To align these processes, an overarching synchronizing strategy could 
focus all efforts on common goals. This would be in line with the aim of SC. It 
would retain variety and adaptability, and support the credibility of the individual 




When discussing organization, structure becomes the most important 
aspect. The Star Model provides a view that considers structure, but tempers the 
desire to fix with restructuring alone. Currently a command staff is comprised of 
distributed staff functions. Public Affairs and IO doctrinally belong to different 
areas of a command. This structure creates distance. Although synchronization 
occurs through working or planning groups, these groups lack the authority to 
drive action. This distributed structure can work against itself. While it builds 
credibility and increases variation in developing informational activities, it lacks 
unity of effort, which potentially decreases the overall credibility and effectiveness 
of informational activities.   
The distributed staff tempts a centralization solution. One structure that 
emerged during the interviews would insert a median in the process spectrum, 
i.e., a central office with distributed staff elements. A central office within the 
command could synchronize and direct informational efforts, while the 
development and execution of these activities would occur in the distributed staff 
elements. This structure would balance variation, adaptability, unity of effort and 
economy of force. Credibility in this construct could be simplified but maintained 
through the distributed structure of the elements.  
6. Culture 
Culture focuses on behaviors and beliefs of a particular group, specifically 
the individual informational elements that might interact in a given strategy. 
Cultures are defined by a common vision, nature, path, set of values or direction. 
Separate cultures would imply that informational elements (PA and IO) would 
have different visions, paths, values, and direction. This construct would provide 
for ample variation and increased complexity. As a result, separate cultures could 
increase the potential for surprise externally and internally. This variation and 
complexity supply significant potential for a new means to communicate. 
Separate cultures potentially limit unity of effort and mass among elements. It 
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also complicates creating economy of force. These limitations and complications 
work against synchronization. Under this construct, existing command and 
control would prevent excessive lack of unity of effort and mass.  
A balance point exists between having a common and several distinct 
cultures. The alignment point is an over-arching culture that allows for distinct 
subcultures. Imagine a homogenous U.S. population whose only differences are 
the result of one’s origin–in being from New York, Indiana, California. The 
American identity is a binding point from which the subcultures derive their 
distinct identities. This construct has the potential for variation and complexity, 
while creating unity of effort and mass. It would provide a mechanism for 
understanding and working with the global and pervasive nature of the 
information environment. It would also create a delicate balance between 
complexity and unity of effort. It serves to preserve distinct credibility while 
providing a binding point for all elements.  
7. Leadership  
Leadership has been identified as a critical piece for organizing and 
synchronizing informational elements. The interviewees provided the following 
desirable leadership traits.145 
 Broad understanding of informational elements 
 Solid communication skills 
 Well-rounded staffing ability 
 Extensive planning and operational background 
A leader with these traits would engender credibility in guiding informational 
activities, and could reinforce synchronization and effectively manage  
 
 
                                            
145 NORAD USNORTHCOM Subject Matter Expert A, B and C, interview by author, 2008; 
JIOWC Subject Matter Expert, interview by author, 2008; JFWC Subject Matter Expert, interview 
by author, 2008; Armstrong, interview by author, 2008. 
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organization. In effect, these traits balance the needs inherent in the principles of 
war and the information environment. While they drive execution, they do not 
allow leadership to replace the other aligning pieces of this model.  
D. ANALYTICAL SUMMATION 
The method employed I would gladly explain, while I have it so 
clear in my head, If I had but the time… but much yet remains to be 
said.146 
Unity of effort, economy of force and mass all point to the need for all 
operations to be focused, coordinated, and synchronized to effectively 
accomplish the mission. The nature of the information environment must be 
factored into all informational activities. The problem space is riddled with 
diverging natures, doctrines, and policy that must be addressed to ensure a 
cohesive narrative for homeland defense and civil support. A modified Star Model 
provides aligning pieces to support all of the demands for a cohesive narrative.  
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V. CAPTURE 
The thing can be done, said the Butcher, I think. 
The thing must be done, I am sure. 
The thing shall be done! Bring me paper and ink, 
The best there is time to procure.147 
The butcher in the quote above is correct. Organizing and synchronizing 
informational elements can be done. This paper has examined Public Affairs 
(PA) and Information Operations (IO) as a microcosm of all informational 
elements within homeland defense and civil support. Within this microcosm, the 
information environment has been defined as complex, global, and pervasive. If 
information is focused on the meaning assigned, then information plays a critical 
role within operations. Information serves to frame any operation, and must be 
considered ahead of or concurrently with any operation. Public Affairs is focused 
on being the primary organizational voice. Information Operations is focused on 
gaining operational advantage with information. The intermixing of PA and IO 
highlights a struggle to accomplish very similar tasks with distinct intended 
audiences. The distinction between these activities lies in how one defines 
informing and influencing, with the credibility of PA being at stake. In practice, 
any informational activity craves credibility with its audience. Strategic 
Communication (SC) is considered a process, albeit a temporary one, according 
to the experts interviewed. This lack of permanence leaves the status quo 
between PA and IO unchanged, while preventing any real change.  
To envision any change in this status quo and to organize and 
synchronize PA and IO into a viable coherent informational strategy, the following 
must occur: 
 Develop and enhance the Department of Defense knowledge of the 
information environment and the information elements to match the 
current knowledge of the domains (air, land, maritime) and their 
operations. 
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 Information Operations must be redefined, similar to the British or 
NATO definitions, to encompass a broad understanding and scope 
that supports operations with the employment of integrated 
capabilities.  
 PA must recalibrate its policy and doctrinal views to nurture a 
culture of connection vice separation to accentuate its role in 
operations.  
 The difference between an informing activity and an influencing 
activity is negligible. These activities need to be defined in a way 
that allows unfettered informational effort in the current information 
environment.  
 While the complexity of the information environment provides no 
best practice, the community and the analysis lean toward a smart 
practice of organization for SC. 
 To create change in how informational elements interact and 
proceed, SC needs a culture and practice that requires 
informational elements to bend to a common path without 
squelching its distinct cultures.  
A.  UNDERSTANDING THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 
The importance of education concerning the information environment and 
how it relates to operations cannot be overstated. Increasingly, defense activities 
rely on shaping or deterring informational activities to accomplish a desired goal. 
The bulk of these activities is informational in nature, and requires a holistic 
approach that includes private and non-governmental organizations. 
Understanding the information environment and information itself is critical to any 
viable strategy for organizing and synchronizing PA and IO. This study has 
presented more about the information environment than exists in current Joint 
doctrine. This indicates a limited understanding of the information environment 
and information, which prevents any deep consideration and realistic execution 
of the informational elements. The information environment, with its intangibles, 
leaves many looking for substantive text to understand its true dimensions. A 




is required to revamp doctrine. It also will provide the planner, operator, and 
decision maker with a view of the environment that allows a natural integration of 
informational activities, just as it would kinetic activities.  
B. INFORMATION OPERATIONS NEED REDEFINING 
The spectrum of potential action for IO abounds, and is only limited by a 
planner’s imagination. The current practice and doctrine of IO is starkly varied. 
Air Force doctrine and policy place PA operations within the scope of IO.148 The 
Army is rewriting IO doctrine where IO capabilities are being scattered to various 
parts of an Army organization.149 Naval and Joint doctrine remains on the 
existing Joint Publication 3–13 path. Joint IO may become obsolete considering 
changes in service doctrine.  
The real issue of IO concerns definition. When one speaks to any 
informational professional, IO is defined differently by each person. This is based 
on the relative position of that person and IO. For instance, an electronic warfare 
professional will view IO as a technical issue. A psychological operations 
professional will say IO is about influence. Each of them would be partially 
correct. However, IO also could be seen as focused exclusively on the core 
capabilities. These differing definitions limit how information becomes integrated 
into operations at large. What is needed is a clear definition, one that would 
provide direction.  
Simply, IO is about gaining the operational advantage with information. 
This is the goal of IO. This vision is clarified by the definition. The definition must 
answer what information and informational elements will be used, and who will 
be affected. 
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In most definitions, IO uses integrated or coordinated capabilities or 
actions to affect others and to protect our own. Both of these actions are 
sufficiently broad and require a specific target. The recipient of an IO action could 
be anyone. Obviously, this is a broad group, too broad for operational benefit. 
More simply, those affected would be adversaries and neutrals; those protected 
would be friendly recipients and other selected groups.  
Therefore, the definition recommended by the author for IO and for 
incorporation into the next version of JP 3–13 is as follows: The integrated 
activities (combined kinetic and non-kinetic or informational) to affect the will, 
understanding or capability of adversaries, neutral and other selected groups 
(others), and to protect the will, understanding or capability of friendly or other 
selected groups (our own). 
This definition is a point of departure for doctrinal development. It 
acknowledges the full spectrum of recipients by looking beyond adversarial and 
friendly groups, and by focusing on people, not things. This distinction may allow 
for action, while keeping the people who will be affected or protected in mind. It 
also focuses first, on what is to be accomplished rather than how it will be 
accomplished, as is the case with the current definition.  
C. PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND THE CULTURE OF CONNECTION 
Public Affairs acts as the primary voice of an organization. Those who 
work in PA understand its role and actions within the organization. The weak link 
lies in its doctrine concerning separation from other informational activities. This 
inhibits the connection PA needs to translate organizational requirements into 
operational action. Separation is an imperative of current PA doctrine, which 
stresses the need for separation between PA and almost every other discipline. 
Despite the call for close coordination with most of these disciplines, separation 
is the mantra of PA. It is rooted in the belief that connection decreases credibility. 
Understandably, credibility is critical, but credibility is inherent in every 
communication, not just PA communications.  
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Public Affairs literature and experts both admit that PA needs to be more 
operational. This would require close coordination and deep connections into the 
planning and operational processes. However, PA cannot be operational and 
separated at the same time. Admittedly, it is the only military discipline that can 
communicate with experience and savvy to the media and the public. This makes 
PA distinct without having to be separate. Potentially, anyone can be a 
communicator, but PA professionals become the conduit for helping those 
communicators. Public Affairs is the communicator of choice, especially in the 
homeland defense and civil support arenas.  
If the goal is to enable PA’s operational credibility, then PA must embrace 
a culture of connection. This means the PA doctrine and policy must avoid 
discussing separation from informational disciplines. No other discipline can act 
in the way PA can, nor should it. Doctrine can define what PA is without defining 
what it is not. The challenge then is about credibility. The doctrine and policy and 
practice of PA must be transparent to its audience, whenever practical, to 
demonstrate its role. The Principle and Fundamentals of Information provide 
plenty of direction in this area.150 Stressing connection instead of separation 
would be step one in creating that culture.  
Second, PA must emphasize the need to be involved in the operational 
and planning processes. If the first recommendation concerns the importance of 
information, then PA must be provided adequate resources (manpower and 
training) to be able to connect to the operational and planning processes. Public 
Affairs personnel must be educated about the planning and operational 
processes to allow for efficient operational integration and interaction. This also 
requires educating PA personnel about the other informational disciplines and 
how they connect to and integrate with other informational elements while 
remaining distinct, not separate, for their own mission set.  
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D. COMMUNICATION VERSUS TO INFORM AND INFLUENCE 
What is the difference between informing activities and influencing 
activities? The difference can only be characterized as a perception. At the core 
of the difference between these activities lies the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948. The 
Smith-Mundt Act prohibits the use of influence materials intended for foreign 
audiences, on domestic audiences.151 This distinction also differentiates what is 
informing (typically PA) and influencing (typically IO).  
This act was conceived during the late 1940s.152 The information 
environment at that time could be controlled with regard to what was released to 
a given audience.153 The current information environment is pervasive, global, 
and complex. Today, a message released in one part of the world can be seen 
by other parts of the world, to include a domestic audience, within minutes. The 
Smith-Mundt Act only serves to limit how the domestic audience participates in 
the international telling of the U.S. narrative. This bifurcation also hampers a 
unity of effort, especially in the PA-IO realm. The distinction between informing 
and influencing activities creates the wedge that drives PA and IO apart in order 
to preserve credibility. Removing this wedge at its legal foundation would allow 
for realigning communication efforts.  
The Smith-Mundt Act needs to be tailored to the current information 
environment. Communication at its root seeks to sway or affect the recipient, 
regardless of seeking to inform or influence. Instead of separating audiences, the 
Smith-Mundt Act should define a set of standards that the U.S. government can 
employ with respect to any audience. The distinction of informing and/or 
influencing would be replaced by standards-driven communication. These 
standards could be a derivative of the DoD Principles of Information or the 
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Principles of Strategic Communication.154 This set of standards would enable a 
universal credibility and unity of effort in the communication realm, while allowing 
for transparency and feedback into communication efforts. The removal of the 
prohibition would allow the domestic audiences to see what is communicated to 
foreign audiences. This would support transparency of message and domestic 
feedback mechanisms in national communication efforts.  
E. SMART PRACTICE IN ORGANIZATION AND SYNCHRONIZATION 
Suggesting one organizational strategy over another must be done with 
significant consideration of the variables at work in the organization. The 
framework suggested below is made with the consideration that the strategy will 
be reviewed to determine if it fits into the current environment. The strategy must 
evolve with the environment. There is no permanent solution to the informational 
challenge, rather a set of evolving strategies that must engage a complex 
environment and manage the numerous pieces connected to the mission. 
Instead of a best practice, this paper recommends an optimal “smart” 
practice based on interviews and model analysis.155 In this environment, the 
smart practice for organization and synchronization would be a central SC office 
with a set of distributed elements within a combatant command. One critical part 
of this smart practice would be that the authority and responsibility for 
informational efforts lies in the core office. Without the authority and responsibility 
here, the elements will not conform to any common direction. This hub of 
authority would provide a means of creating a cohesive narrative and 
overarching culture that drives the elements to employ their capabilities 
effectively. This framework also would balance variation, unity of effort, and  
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economy of force and mass. It would allow distinct elements to retain their 
processes, cultures, and capabilities, while allowing for a common structure and 
narrative for the organization.  
F. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION NEEDS AUTHORITY 
Strategic Communication is a process that synchronizes informational 
efforts. The struggle to organize and synchronize these elements falls to SC 
personnel. If SC is temporary in nature, then no transformation of the elements 
will occur. Granted, the SC process should be organic to the staff at large, but 
the size and composition of the staff precludes an effective organic process 
among elements. The informational elements are driven by their individual 
natures. Just like Newton’s first law of motion, these elements will act as they 
always have unless acted upon by an outside force. Strategic Communication 
can force that change if it has the appropriate authority. To force that 
transformation, SC must be given primacy over informational elements. Strategic 
Communication leadership must be able to guide other elements with the tacit 
authority of the organizational leadership.   
Strategic Communication also needs a culture that guides the subcultures 
of the distinct informational elements. This would provide the common direction 
and values of the organizational objectives. It can be harnessed by policy and 
education. Each informational element should retain its distinct culture and 
activity, but the SC culture would provide a touchstone within the organization for 
these elements. The policy should also dictate the link between organizational 
leadership and the SC personnel. All organizational leaders should be educated 
about the SC process and policy, and the informational elements.  
One risk in the policy realm is the temptation to develop doctrine. Doctrine 
serves to codify the standard day-to-day practices that have been successful in 
the past in a given area. This paper has identified the limitations of doctrine in the 
areas of PA and IO. Strategic Communication must be allowed flexibility based 
on the complex information environment, organizational geography, and the 
 65
desired effects, which a written doctrine cannot do. Strategic Communication 
doctrine would hamper any effort to find workable solutions for synchronizing 
informational efforts.  
G. FINDING THE SNARK IN INFORMATIONAL ELEMENTS 
For the Snark’s a peculiar creature, that won’t be caught in a 
commonplace way. Do all that you know, and try all that you don’t: 
not a chance must be wasted to-day!156 
Just like the Snark, an organizational strategy is a peculiar creature. It will 
not be caught or realized in a commonplace way. Homeland defense and civil 
support are two missions where informational efforts are critical to achieving the 
mission objectives. Public Affairs and IO have distinct natures that support 
homeland defense and civil support. These natures are seemingly mirrors of one 
another. Public Affairs is an organizational and credibility focused element. 
Information Operations is an operational and advantage-gaining element. These 
differences are bound to their doctrine. Doctrine drives the respective cultures 
and directions. One issue defines the divide between PA and IO, and that is the 
difference between informing activities versus influencing activities. While no 
clear distinction exists between these activities, this issue is the greatest 
challenge to organizing and synchronizing PA and IO. Strategic Communication 
provides a potential force to transform these elements into synchronized 
elements while maintaining their distinct natures.  
To identify a viable and coherent organizational strategy for informational 
elements, leadership must understand the information environment. Within that 
environment, leadership must understand each distinct element’s capabilities and 
cultures, and the complexity of these informational elements working 
simultaneously. Then leadership can develop and employ a process and 
structure that retains the variation of means and supports unity of effort, economy 
of force and mass.  
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Considering all of the recommendations, an organization or command 
(such as a combatant command) would have a central SC office. That office 
would coordinate to create and refine activities associated with any operation. 
These SC activities would be tied to operations and mission accomplishment. In 
advance of an event, planning would create potential activities for PA and IO to 
develop and execute. The command leadership would understand and expect 
these activities due to their understanding of the importance of the information 
environment to the success of the operation.  
Public Affairs would be integral to several elements of the command, 
including IO. Public Affairs staff would monitor the situation, understanding the 
scope of potential activities that would communicate the desired objectives of the 
mission. Information Operations would develop information objectives to support 
the entire operation. These activities would be refined for optimal use and effect 
in the operation. Public Affairs and IO could work in close coordination without 
fear of trampling the communication or element credibility. The event in the 
information environment would be a synchronized narrative of the operation. This 
narrative would enable operations in a timely and effective manner to support 
civil authorities or homeland defense.  
In this study, the Snark may be SC. If given authority, it has the potential 
to be the overarching culture that could force the elements toward a common 
cohesive path. Strategic Communication could drive a synchronized process that 
preserves the credibility of each distinctive element, while allowing for the 
adaptability, multiple voices, and paths for successfully engaging the 
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